Netaji Subhash Chandra Bose Page 8

  But Bose’s tale was the tale of peril he invited for himself, for the sake of India’s freedom. Incidentally, bored by Hitler’s long monologue on what he should do and what he shouldn’t, Bose losing his patience, told him very curtly, ‘British CIDs are very efficient, but as despite that I escaped them, if I realise my mission would not succeed in Germany, please tell your Excellency (to the interpreter during the meeting) that I would escape his Gestapo also.’

  Like his interpreter, Hitler was taken aback by Bose’s straight-talking, but more than being impressed, he promised him all assistance and told him not to waste his precious life by trying to undertake a journey to Japan by an Italian plane, which would put his life in danger. Netaji Through German Lens, by Nanda Mookherjee.

  Bose knew the dreadful consequences that he could face if Hitler hadn’t been impressed by his straight-talk — his next stay would have been in some grotesque concentration camp.

  It was not explained by German documents why Hitler tolerated such outbursts, however, Nanda Mookherjee, in his book, gave us an idea of Bose’s diplomatic skill by which he could successfully pressurise Germany through Mussolini and Japan, to agree to his travelling to South Asia.

  Though later the journey he had to undertake was equally perilous, as despite a relatively safe route being worked out, it was never truly safe.

  The German submarine which took Bose to Japan was blown off by the English Navy as it was returning after accomplishing its mission.

  Yet Bose never gave an impression to anyone that after Berlin opened another front with Russia, chances of Axis victory got not only slowed down but extremely doubtful.

  After all, as an unhurt America was getting involved with England, German, Italian and Japanese victories were becoming an uncertain proposition. This, however, he told some of his German friends.

  Bose thus swam the great seas in submarines to reach Japan and lead the INA with the grit of a supreme commander and proved to be a visionary as an international political analyst who predicted how, after the war, the world would get divided into two camps. That, however, was the beginning of a division that would finally also script his doom.

  CHAPTER FOUR

  Bose Weighs Options:

  For the last struggle,

  decides for Russia

  ‘Tell my countrymen, India will be free before long...’

  - Bose’s last message to his nation.

  I

  t was March 1943, when an unhappy Bose left Germany, doubtful about an Axis victory after Hitler opened a front against the Soviet Union, with America goaded into the war and also joining the Allies in Europe.

  It was not exactly known whether Bose began to explore an alternative for his next operational zone immediately after he left Europe.

  However, gradually realisation dawned upon Bose that Hitler had taken more than he could chew, and simultaneously was at war with Russia, Britain, and now also America (which had entered the war in full scale).

  Thus, he was doubtful about an Axis victory in Europe, and the Nazi leaders could not stop him from openly criticising Germany for having launched its military campaign against Russia.

  Bose criticised Hitler’s war policy and wrote strong letters to his ministers against the attack on Russia. Most interestingly, even though, the Soviet Union had problems issuing Bose a transit visa in 1941, from Kabul for his journey into Berlin, they uttered no word against him during his stay either in Europe or in Japan.

  However, Bose’s meeting Hitler in March 1942 ended in a big disappointment for him as he failed to see reasons in what the Nazi leader told him. Though Bose was always frank and dignified, he gave Hitler a piece of his mind vis-à-vis his interpretation of the war and the outcome, and it didn’t went in favour of the German leader!

  However, he also realised that Germany’s interest in India’s independence wasn’t that keen, and even the German war leaders wouldn’t like to utilise the opportunity war had offered them properly, Netaji Through German Lens, by Nanada Mookherjee.

  A call from South East Asia sustained Bose, as, till 1943, Japan had not got their offensives slowed down against the Anglo-American forces in Asia.

  The journey by the German and Japanese submarines, which lasted 18 weeks, finally ended on 2nd July with his arrival in Singapore, and the air of welcome and victories overwhelmed him, as did his presence overwhelm the Indians and Japanese leaders.

  Within a week, he assumed the supreme leadership of the Indian Independence League and the Indian National Army from another great revolutionary Rash Behari Bose, and Japan’s Prime Minister Hideki Tojo was at his side.

  Soon, he was mobilising his army with speeches that had cast a hypnotic spell on millions of civilians and army men. He told his solders, ‘I want total mobilisation for a total war and nothing less’. His eloquence mixed with his charisma led millions of Indians in South East Asia to believe him, let alone the former Indian British soldiers who were now in INA. ‘At long last we have a leader we could believe,’ wrote Shah Nawaz Khan in his memoir. Khan, though willy-nilly, later become Nehru’s man.

  Even Gandhi and Churchill’s biographer Arthur Herman agreed that his (Bose’s) eloquence only matched (that of) British Prime Minister's with an explicit hint at 10 Downing Street.

  Bose compared the difference between his stay in Europe and his stay in Japan, for, at least in Japan, he had soon developed a personal friendship with Japanese leader Tojo.

  However, as ill-luck would have it, even in South East Asia, notwithstanding INA’s success on 18 March 1944 in crossing frontiers and occupying Indian soil, disaster began to unfold in Asia rapidly as both Britain and America began to make steady inroads after they had reconsolidated their strategic positions in Europe.

  And Bose now began to seriously think about the options he would have after the war was over in favour of the Allies.

  During the course of weighing options after the 1944 debacles in South East Asia, Bose was even tempted to think of a surrender with his army men ‘which would have made his military defeat into an apparent victory by pushing an exhausted Britain to an “incalculable’’ (to quote Viceroy Lord Wavell) and greater jeopardy in Asia’. Why British feared Bose most, The Times of India, 23 January, 1989, by author.

  This debate initially stirred up great heat and dust within his ministers, who advised their leader not to surrender and explore another operational zone from where he could carry out his last struggle to liberate India not only politically but socio-economically.

  And Bose, who, according to Dr Purabi Roy, kept in constant touch with leaders in Kremlin, wanted to open a more direct channel with Russia. Bose’s efforts included opening an office in Omsk in the Soviet Union.

  Bose soon forgot his 1941 troubles, with Russia issuing him a transit visa.

  Dr Roy, recalled and wrote about Russia dragging its feet in 1941: ‘Though all relevant documents related to Bose were already in Comintern’s custody, following certain developments, Kremlin’s reaction was negative. The situation at the southern border of USSR during 1940-1941 was tense. On the basis of a German misinformation, the British government allegedly apprehended an attack on India by the Red Army and worked out a plan to bombard the oil industry in Baku. Under these circumstances, the Soviet government was unable to provide a positive response to the proposal by the member of Third International, (a globally powerfull communist body with Kremlin backing) on Subhas Bose’s visit to the USSR.’ The Search for Netaji: New Findings, Introduction Dr Purabi Roy, p xxi.

  Though there isn’t any insight into whether Bose’s Russian contacts explained to him about why it took time for them to give Bose a transit visa or allow Bose to stay on in Russia, but it became clear that somehow Bose’s fatal obsession with Kremlin did not turn into a closed door affair.

  Once in Japan, where Bose was treated as Head of the State with more dignity, he always tried to open contacts with Russia, even though initially the Japanese disliked it.

&
nbsp; Bose resisted such Japanese overtures, and wrote to Russian ambassador Jacob Malik in Tokyo to help him in opening a channel with Russian leaders, including Stalin.

  A letter dug out from the Komitet gosudarstvennoy bezopasnosti (KGB) files by a former Pravda correspondent, UL Kuznets, who was in Kabul from 1980-1988, was a case in point. The letter was published (translated by Dr Purabi Roy to English from Russian) in The Mystery of the Disappearance of Netaji.

  In a rather long letter, Bose, on a letter head of Arzi Hukumate Azad Hind, on a Monday, 20 November 1944, first tried to clarify his government’s stand as an ally of the Axis bloc, INA Government, on Soviet Union. ‘I cannot deny the fact that at the moment we are closely associated with Axis power for a common struggle against the Anglo-American bloc. I am glad to inform you that the Axis power is now having a clear idea about the main problems of India and they have accorded recognition to the Azad Hind State (Free India) for which we are thankful to them. Besides, Japan’s relations with the Soviet Union are strictly neutral. Even the German government can understand fully well, and evaluate the fact that we Indians are only fighting against UK and USA. The Germans have shave also understood and appreciated the fact that we are not interested to go against Soviet Russia. Certainly, activities of my organisation have generated the exclusive impression that we are only fighting against the Anglo-American bloc and not against Soviet Russia.’

  In his letter, Bose noticeably repeated his ‘Free India State’s military campaigns’ as non-anti-Soviet in character.

  But more than anything, Bose’s letter dug out from the KGB files made clear his intention to seek Soviet help, which though the older generation of CPI leadership explains as ‘immature and unwise of Bose’.

  ‘Immediately after the war, an exhausted Russia wasn’t in a position to materially help India’s independence,’ K Ponda told this writer, adding, ‘then they had an unpredictable misanthropist (read Stalin) heading CPSU and Kremlin.’

  Another proof that Bose kept his contacts with Russian leaders was the outcome of three researchers – Dr Purabi Roy, Dr Hari Vasudevan, and Dr Sovanlal Dutta Gupta. These three scholars visited Russia to undertake research covering Indo-Russian relations between 1917 and 1947.

  ‘The scholars collected materials from (1) Archives of Comintern, (2) Archives of the Central Committee, (3) State Archives of Russian Federation, (4) Russian State Archives of the Economy, (5) Archives the Academy Of Sciences, (6) State Archives of Soviet Army, (7) Archives of the Ministry of External Affairs of Russian Federation, and (8) State Archives of Army History. Research papers said.

  The scholars, who were carrying out their second phase of investigation, believed that ‘more investigation into the other archives would eventually clear the smoke on Bose’s end’.

  The Asiatic Society, which was actually carrying out the research with the scholars, meanwhile requested the Government of India to formally send a request to their Russian counterparts to let these scholars see the KGB and President’s Archives, and this request made the then Congress Prime Minister Narasimha Rao so furious that he cancelled his visit to the Asiatic Society on 15 September 1995!

  ‘But not to take a chance, he sent External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee in November to Moscow to request them not to open up other archives to Indian scholars,’ disclosed Dr Roy.

  It wasn't however surprising as it was proven on countless times and on countless occasions that many Indian governments tried their best to fudge the truth, and also make sure that ‘spin-offs’ of the new free Russia did not go disclosing the truth about Bose’s end.

  Meanwhile, Vladmir Putin, a former KGB man, took over and could not but gladden his Indian counterparts in Delhi, by effectively switching off information flow that was coming out of Russian archives. After all he happens to be modern ghost of Russia’s Stalinist’s past.

  What was more important was that the truth was out by efforts made by dedicated post-Independence politicians, Satyanarayan Sinha, H V Kamath, Prof Samar Guha, bureaucrat, such as NG Goray, and many others bore fruits.

  Again, after a decade or two by Dr Purabi Roy (please refer to her interview) and the Communist Party of India sources which I have exclusively quoted (despite efforts to the contrary by Congress governments in India, and governments in Russia, Britain, and America trying to sit with the secret documents).

  Or even destroying some such as the Mukherjee Commission which was told that quite a few files were destroyed by the Prime Minister’s (Indira Gandhi) instruction without keeping a copy of the contents or an explanation as why they were destroyed!

  This happens to be the truth, notwithstanding some self-proclaimed truth-busters, and relentless efforts by Indian governments, barring Morarji Desai, to prevent any leak about Bose being in Moscow, and ‘thence sent to Siberia, may be’.

  While Bose paid for his fatal misunderstanding of Kremlin’s communist mindset, the Indian government’s plans to do in with the truth failed!

  To pick up the thread from whence we left, while Bose was trying to persuade Japanese authorities regarding the urgency of opening a channel with Kremlin, he was informed on 12 August 1945, that war was about to end on the Asian front as Hikari Kikan, the then Japanese Prime Minister, had taken a decision to surrender to the advancing Allies.

  At Saramban, Malaysia at that time, Bose immediately left for Singapore where he discussed what could be his next move with his cabinet.

  ‘The final decision was taken on the 14th, when Sakai arrived and conferred with Bose. It was decided that Bose himself should leave Singapore and try to escape to Russia where he hoped to find asylum,’ mentions the Khosla Commission.

  According to Dr Purobi Roy, Bose advanced the arguments for his moving to Russia on two grounds. First, Russia would give him shelter as its honeymoon would be over with America and Britain soon after the war, and secondly, he would use his office to influence Kremlin to be more sympathetic to Japan after the war. By then, an expansionist Kremlin began showing its interest in Manchuria.

  He told Japanese leaders, perhaps also Tojo, his personal friend (though Tojo’s papers and documents were not declassified as yet by Japan), that Bose could take a chance.However, if he failed with the Russians, it would be his personal failure and nothing more.

  Japan, now thoroughly destabilised by American brutalities – two Atom bombs – agreed to the options that Bose offered them.

  According to a KGB input offered to K Ponda, with two atom bombs ‘failing to physically destroy Bose, Japan also wanted an international Left leader like him to intervene and stop Russian aggression.’

  A British Intelligence report observed at one point: ‘Col. Tada, staff officer of FM Terauchi (Supreme commander, Japanese South East Asia Command) told Mr Ayer (Bose’s Information and Broadcasting Incharge, and later also Nehru’s ‘chosen one’ just like Shah Nawaz Khan).

  After the end of the war when Japan surrendered, Terauchi took all responsibilities to help Netaji and asked him (Tada) to go to Kaka Bose (His Excellency Bose) and tell him to reach Russian territory. All help will be given to him. It was arranged that Chandra Bose will fly in the plane in which General Shidei was going. General Shidei will look after Chandra Bose upto Dairen, and there after, he (Bose) could fall back on his own resources to contact the Russians... The Japanese would announce to the world that Bose had disappeared from Dairen. That would absolve them of all responsibilities in the eyes of the Allies.’ From proceedings of Khosla Commission 1970.

  However, as we later saw, Wavell British Viceroy in India didn’t have faith in the Japanese announcement regarding Bose’s death, although he wished it was true.

  He wrote in his diary: ‘I wonder if the Japanese announcement on Subhas Chandra Bose’s death in an air crash was true. I suspect it very much. It is just what would be given out if he wanted to go underground. My first reaction when I heard it was to tell P.S.V. (an officer’s name as a code word) to ask the South East Army Chief to make more careful
inquiries into the story as soon as possible they could. If it is true, it will be of great relief. His (Bose’s) disposal would have presented a most difficult problem.’ Viceroy Journal, published by UK Government.

  Thus, wasn’t Bose correct when he proposed that he should have surrendered with his ministers and remaining legionaries? His defeat would have turned into an apparent victory. Why British feared Subhas Bose most, Santanu Banerjee, The Times of India, 23 January 1989.

  In another important note, Field Marshall Viscount Wavell appeared to have written to Pethick-Lawrence, the then secretary of States for India and Burma, in a rather long letter, describing the prevailing political situation (post-INA phenomenon) in India: ‘This is the first occasion in which an anti-British politician (read Bose in absentia) acquired a hold over a substantial number of men in the Indian Army, and the consequences are quite incalculable. Many of the INA men obviously have great regard for Bose and he may yet become a national hero. The Cabinet should consider very carefully what to do about him. If he could be disposed off (no clarity or elaboration whether Wavell wanted to have him killed to safeguard British interest) without being sent back to India, I am sure it would be a good thing.’ Transfer of Power, secret letter no L/PO/10/22, Vol Sixth, pp 105-109.

  However, soon investigations and findings from Sir E Jenkins to Sir F Muddie (Bose in Russian hand) removed all tension from British minds as far as possibility of his immediate resurfacing in India was concerned.

  It would be wrong to say that all fears generated by Bose were over. While his being in Russia may have toned down the pressure, but nothing was absolutely safe for the British there after.